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China’s Higher Education Expansion and its Labor Market 
Consequences 
 
Using a 1/5 random draw of the 1% census of 2005, we investigate how China’s higher 
education expansion commenced in 1999 affects the education opportunities of various 
population groups and how this policy affects the labor market. Treating the expansion as an 
experiment and using a LATE framework, we find that higher education expansion increased 
the probability of go to college tremendously. Different populations “benefit” from this policy 
differently however. Minority female, those from central-western region and from rural areas 
are less likely to benefit from it. One-child families are more responsive to this policy. Using 
higher education resources at the provincial level as another dimension of variation, and 
using a difference-in-difference strategy, we find that the education expansion decreased the 
within sector inequality of population with above high school (inclusive) education. This is 
primarily due to the increase of the income level for high school graduate. That of the college 
graduate deceased, but only slightly and not significantly. 
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1.  Introduction 
China’s higher education has been experiencing transformation during the whole reform 
period, and is still transforming. Ever since the beginning of the reform and open-up policy, 
the scale of higher education in terms of new entering college students and college graduates 
kept increasing. But the increase in the 1980s and most of 1990s is not large, which is 
especially dwarfed by the major increase in 1999 and thereafter. In 1999, the central 
government of China made a decision to enlarge the scale of higher education. As a result, the 
number of new students admitted to college increased by over 40% in 1999 with comparison 
1998. By 2005, the number of new college students over quadrupled (4.7) that of 1998. Given 
the unprecedented scale of the expansion, many people term this radical policy a great leap 
forward in higher education. The questions we want to answer in this paper are twofold. First, 
how this radical change affects the education opportunity of different individuals? Second, 
what’s the labor market consequence of this expansion? The empirical strategies are also 
twofold: one is Before-After, the other is Difference-in-Difference. The data is a 1/5 random 
draw from the 1% census data in 2005. 
We treat the expansion policy as a natural experiment. Due to the expansion, individuals 
taking college entrance exams before and after the expansion policy have different 
probabilities of being admitted to college. Meanwhile, the before and after group are largely 
determined based on their ages, which are exogenous. Therefore we separate all individuals 
into two groups according to their ages. The younger group took college examinations after 
1999 (if they take at all), and the younger group took the exams before 1998.
1 We also realize 
that this policy didn’t affect the whole population homogeneously. High school graduate of 
extremely high (low) ability will (not) be able to enter college disregard of the policy. 
Financial constraints also play a role. Therefore, only part of the high school graduates is 
really affected, and these people at the margin are our focus. Therefore, we used a LATE 
framework developed by Imbens and Angrist (1994).
2 
We find that higher education expansion increased the probability of going to college 
tremendously, and that different populations “benefit” from this policy differently. In language 
of treatment effect literature, compliers are less likely to be minority female, they are more 
likely to come from one-child family, and they are less likely to come from central-western 
region. These results indicate that the economic unbalance in China makes it hard for all 
                                                               
1 Of course, due to the fact that we don’t have information of the exact year when people go to college (or graduate from high 
school), this separation is doomed to have errors. 
2 See also Angrist and Pischke (2008). 3 
 
families to benefit from the expansion policy homogeneously. The story underlying this result 
is that poor families face more severe credit constraint or that the economic conditions make 
those from poor families less ready to go to college (due to poor academic performance in high 
school). This result is consistent with Wang et al, (2007). They find “evidence consistent with 
the growing influence of private financial constraints”. The evidence that Wang et al.’s 
conclusion is based on are the estimated returns to education using several repeated cross 
section between 1988 and 2002. Our evidence is more direct. 
The expansion increased the supply of college graduate, whose employment is a major 
problem in current China. Meanwhile, the proportion of high school graduate decline 
relatively. In the second part of our paper, we investigate how the expansion policy affects the 
relative income between high school graduate and college graduate. Instead of using 
individual level data, we study how the expansion affects intra-sector inequality and average 
income levels for high school and college graduate respectively. To identify this relationship, 
we introduce provincial level higher education resources before the expansion as another 
dimension of variation, because individuals in provinces with more tertiary education 
resources are much more likely to benefit from the expansion policy. We find that sector level 
inequality for high school graduates and college graduates is lower if there’re more younger 
people and its province have more college resources. The increase of income level for high 
school graduate played the major role, and the slight decline in income of college graduate 
played an insignificant and minor role. We regard the above relationships as causal, and these 
causal effects have strong implications for evaluating the expansion policy. 
Although we do not estimate the return to education directly, we can interpret the results 
as follows: expansion policy decreased the return to college. This relates our paper to the 
existing literature on China’s college premium. It seems well established that the return to 
education has increased gradually in the 1980s and 1990s, and the increase in college premium 
is more prominent (Zhang et al., 2005; Li and Ding, 2005, among many others). However, the 
most updated estimates are still rare,
3 and there’s no research explicitly taking the expansion 
policy into consideration, to our best knowledge. From methodological point of view, our 
paper is similar to Han and Zhang (2008), and Meng and Gregory (2007). Both studies look 
into how the Cultural Revolution affected the education opportunities of individuals. Han and 
Zhang’s focus is on how people continue their education after the interruption. Meng and 
Gregory estimate the economic cost of the Cultural Revolution from the perspective of 
                                                               
3 In Zhang et al, (2005), the latest data they use is for 2002. In Wang et al, (2007), the data is for 2002. At this time, the 
economic consequences of expansion policy are not prominent because people go to college after expansion haven’t entered 
into the labor market yet. 4 
 
forgone earnings. For studies in other country, Duflo (2000) is an extraordinary example who 
studies how the school construction in Indonesia increased the opportunity of education and 
therefore economic possibilities. Duflo also used a DID strategy to identify how school 
construction affect education and income. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly described the higher education 
transformation in the late 1990s and our data. Section 3 studies how expansion policy affects 
education opportunities, in particular, we characterized the compliers of this natural 
experiment. In section 4, we investigate how the expansion policy affect intra-sector 
inequality between college graduates and high school graduates. Section 5 concludes. 
2.  China’s Great Leap Forward in Higher Education: Background and data 
2.1 Expansion, Rise in Tuition, and Decentralization 
With the reform and opening up policy, China’s education system also underwent major 
transformations. The process of transformations is well summarized in the following four 
major official documents: 
z  Decisions on Reforming the Education System, (Central Committee of CPC, 1985) 
z  Guides for China’s Education Reform and Development, (The State Council, 1993) 
z  On Deepening the Reform of the Higher Education System, (The Ministry of Education
4, 
1995) 
z  Higher Education Law of the People's Republic of China, 1999 
Closely related to our research are the following three aspects: scale expansion, 
abolishment of heavy subsidies (rise in tuitions), and decentralization between local and 
central government in the management of higher education. From 1978 to 1998, the scale of 
higher education kept increasing. The number of colleges increased from 598 to 1022, the 
number of new college students enrollment increased from 0.4 million to 1.08 million, and the 
number of college students increased from 0.86 million to 3.41 million. Although the scale of 
higher education enlarged continuously (both in terms of establishment number and in terms 
of the students or graduates number), the growth rate is much lower than those in and after 
1999. In early 1999, the central government decided to increase the number of students 
admitted to tertiary education by 0.22 million. In June, the central government and the 
Ministry of Education suddenly made an announcement that a further 0.33 million new 
students will be admitted. These decisions made 1999 a historical year in the development of 
China’s higher education. The number of new college students experienced the largest 
                                                               
4 The former National Education Committee. 5 
 
increase ever since (48%).
5 For many of the high school graduates and their families, the 
expansion was unexpected. Given that the college entrance exams was in early July, the 
announcements made in early 1999 and especially the one in June will not change the behavior 
of high school graduate much. The “unexpectedness” of the announcement made this policy 
more like an experiments.
6 In subsequent years, the number of new college students kept 
increasing. In 2005, the number of new college students was 5.04 millions, 4.7 times of that in 
1998. Meanwhile, the total number of college students in China ranked the first all over the 
world, amounting to 23 million. And the gross enrollment rate of higher education increased 
by 11.2%, reaching 21%. 
Under the traditional central planning regime, higher education was heavily subsidized. 
With economic reform and with the enlargement of higher education scale, Chinese 
government lowered the level of subsidies for higher education gradually. In “Guidelines for 
China’s Education Reform and Development” published in 1993, the central government 
made it clear that higher education is noncompulsory, and students should pay tuition in 
principle (The State Council, 1993). From 1995 to 2004, the tuition fee increased from 800 
RMB per person year to 5000 RMB per person year on average (Yang, 2006). The expenditure 
on education ranked the first in the total expenditure in the 10
th 5-year-plan (CYCRC, 2007). 
The high tuition level makes some families facing more severe financial constraint, so that 
some students from poor families gave up the college opportunities.
7 This also means that the 
poor families would benefit less from the expansion policy. In addition to the abolishment of 
heavy subsidies, another major reform is to cancel the planning system for allocating college 
graduates to work positions. The new system resembles a two-sided market. The graduates 
find jobs based on mutual agreements with employers, with much less intervention from the 
government. With the expansion of higher education, college graduates face more and more 
severe competition, putting great pressure on the labor market. 
                                                               
5 Some media described this reform as the “Great Leap Forward of Higher Education.” 
(http://gaokao.zhongzhao.com/article/2007-7-15/200771513252290.shtml). 
6 The initiation of higher education expansion in the late 1990s is also closely related to the economic conditions at that time. 
In 1997, the 15
th National Congress of Communist Party of China quickened the reform of the economic regime. Large 
amount of formerly state owned enterprises were privatized. This caused large amount of laid-off or unemployed workers. 
Meanwhile, the financial crisis happened in 1997 also had a negative impact on Chinese economy, which deteriorate the 
employment condition. Under these backgrounds, higher education expansion was initiated as an instrument to alleviate the 
unemployment problem and to stimulate consumption. 
7 According to some calculation, the expenditure per student per year is around 10,000 RMB. The net per capita incomes in 
urban and rural areas were 9422 RMB and 2936 RMB respectively. It cost 4.2 and 13.6 years of net income for an average 
urban individual and rural individual respectively to support one child to finish a 4-year college education. Although some 
measures were taken (scholarship, subsidized loans for examples), the credit constraint problem seems not have been 
alleviated effectively (Yuan, 2008). 6 
 
Another aspect that influences the effect of the expansion policy is China’s geographic 
unbalance and segregation, not only in terms of economic development but also in terms of 
administration of higher education resources. One important aspect is the decentralization of 
the administration of colleges and universities in the mid 1990s. With the deepening of the 
reform, the higher education system has evolved into a two-layer system, with the central 
government (through the Ministry of Education) managing a few brand comprehensive 
universities, and the provincial government, municipalities, or autonomous regions managing 
most local universities. In effect, decentralization gives provincial government great 
autonomy. The admission quota to college and the setup of specialty fields that are allowed to 
have students can be determined at the provincial level. It’s true that individuals have some 
freedom to select college or university throughout the whole nation. But the allocation of 
admission quota often biased toward local students to great extent, and this is even true for 
universities being managed by the central government (Peking University, Fudan University, 
Sun Yat-Sen University for example). Provinces with more higher education resources have 
more capacity to expand after 1999, and individuals from these provinces are more likely to 
“benefit” from the expansion policy. 
2.2 Data 
The data we use is a one-fifth random draw from the 1% census data of China conducted by 
the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) in 2005. The sample size is around 2.3 million 
individuals covering 31 provinces, municipalities and autonomous regions. Because our focus 
is the effect of the expansion policy after 1999, we keep only those who are most likely 
influenced (aged 22 to 35). Because we don’t have the information when people take the 
college entrance exams, we assume that people enter the primary school at age 6, and they go 
to college at age 18.
8 The theoretical year for them to take the college entrance exams is 
between 1988 and 2001. In fact, many of them have not taken the college entrance exams. 
They may have dropped out of school before they got high school degree. Even they finished 
the high school they may also not to have the exams. But in order to know whether they belong 
to the cohorts affected by the policy, we need the hypothetical college exam year. Table 1 
                                                               
8 The typical timing of education in China is as follows: go to primary school at age 6, after 6 years of primary school, they go 
to junior middle school for 3 years. Completing junior middle school became compulsory from the 1980s (so called 9-year 
compulsory education). After junior middle school, people can choose to go to high school which takes 3 years to complete. 
They can also go to technical or professional school (zhongzhuan). Upon graduation from high school, graduates participate 
in college entrance examinations if they want college education. Usually people with lower scores go to 3 year professional 
college (dazhuan); and those with high score go to 4 year college. It’s worth mentioning that, even until very recently, the 
education regime is different among various regions. In some areas, primary school takes 5 years only. But people go to 
school 1 year older. Therefore this difference will not have effect on our calculation. However, we don’t pretend that there are 
no errors from other sources. 7 
 
presents the distribution of different ages. The average age is about 29. Around 52% are 
females. Slightly more than 10% are minorities. 11% of them have college or above degrees. 
3.  Higher Education Expansion and Education Opportunity 
3.1 Expansion and Education Opportunity 
For every age group, we calculate their theoretical year of taking college entrance exams. 
Figure 1 gives the share of different education levels in each age group. We kept only those 
with high school degree and above for the following two reasons. First, junior middle school is 
compulsory according to the law. Second, the people who are affected by this expansion policy 
are those high school graduates. Within the age groups between 28 and 35, the number of high 
school graduate decreased from those aged 35 to 28. There is considerable fluctuation from 
those aged 28 to 22. One notable thing is that the number of high school graduate dropped 
significantly for the 1998 cohort. The reasons underlying this drop are unclear. We made the 
following conjectures. First, the total number of this cohort is relatively small. Second, some 
graduates who are expected to take college exams postponed their exams to the next year once 
they anticipated the expansion in 1999. Another possibility is that those failed in 1998 took the 
exams again in 1999 and succeeded. The retiming story is possible but is not consistent with 
the background of the policy. Once we consider the proportion instead of the number, the trend 
is less volatile. Almost over the whole period, the proportion of high school graduate increased 
gradually although the absolute number decreased. The increasing trend stopped at 1998. The 
above possible reasons are applicable here also.  
The change in the number of (4-year) college graduate and above is the most remarkable. 
Before 1998, the change in the number of college graduate is small, with the number of male 
college graduate decreased slightly and females increased slightly. In 1999 and thereafter 
however, both the number of male and female college graduates witnessed huge jumps. The 
number of new college student increased by nearly 50% in 1999, and the sharp increase 
continued in subsequent years. 
The two panels in the middle column of Figure 1 show the number and share of 
professional college (3-year professional college). As for the absolute numbers, males and 
females have different trend. The number of male professional graduates decreased, whereas 
the number for females increased. When we consider the proportion, they increased for both 
genders. But the trend stopped even before 1998 (1995 for male and 1997 for female). There 
seems little relationship between expansion policy and the change in number of professional 
graduates.  8 
 
In the following, we investigate how the expansion affects individual’s education choice 
using a multinomial logit model (see Table 2). Notice that we already dropped the sample of 
junior middle school and below. An individual with at least high school level, has three 
choices upon graduation: employment, profession school (3 years), or go to college (above 4 
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I=0, 1, 2 represents the above three choices for a high school graduate (0 for employment, 
1 for profession school, and 2 for college). I=0 is used as the reference group in the estimation. 
policy is a dummy for expansion policy (policy=1 and policy=0 for younger and older groups 
respectively). We can therefore calculate how the expansion policy affects individuals’ choice 
(holding others constant): 
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Suppose s=2. The probability ratio of go to college to employment increased 
by 2 exp( ) γ times after expansion. If 0 s γ > , that means the relative probability of going to 
college increases. The results are reported in part A of Table 2. The first two columns are for 
males. Obviously, the relative probability of going to college increased with expansion policy 
(RRR=EXP(0.2)>1). The relative probability of going to professional school doesn’t change 
significantly however. In addition, we find no significant increasing trend of going to college 
for male (T for the year of taking college entrance exams). Column 4 and 5 are for females. 
Similar to male, the relative probability increased significantly with expansion, and the 
relative probability of going to professional school have not changed significantly around the 
time of expansion. Different from male, the increasing trend of going to college is significant 
for females. 
In order to gain more confidence that the increase in relative probability is due to 
expansion policy, we do a placebo study. Instead of treating those having college entrance 
exams after 1999 as one single category, we separate them into three subgroups (1999, 2000, 
and 2001). Meanwhile, we also create a dummy for the 1998 cohort. It turns out the 9 
 
coefficients for year 1998 is not significant. This means that the significance for dummies for 
1999, 2000, and 2001 is due to the expansion policy, not due to other factors influencing the 
time trend.  
We perform an independence test next. Imagine two scenarios. In the first one, a high 
school graduate chooses between employment and going to college. With the expansion policy, 
the probability of going to college will increase and that of seeking employment with high 
school degree will decrease. In the second scenario, there’s a third choice (professional school). 
High school graduates can choose professional school in this scenario. Those planned going to 
professional school may also choose college now. Therefore the choice between employment 
and college education may be dependent on whether there is a third choice. Whether the 
dependence property holds also has implication for the restructuring of higher education. To 
test dependence property statistically, we delete those professional graduates. The results are 
in column 3 and 6 for male and female respectively. As there are only two choices in the 
estimation, the multinomial logit model degenerates to a binary logit model. For male, the 
coefficients in the choice of college are very close to their counterparts in the multinomial logit 
model. In both part A and part B, we can’t reject the hypothesis that the two sets of coefficients 
are equal. The test on the coefficients of the reform variables (either the single policy dummy 
in part A or multi dummies in part B) also has the same conclusion. The result for female is a 
little different. Statistical test rejects that the coefficients are equal. Even though, the 
difference is small in magnitude of the estimates.  
We have shown that the third alternative (professional college) have no significant effect 
on the choice between employment and college. This conclusion is important for two reasons. 
First, it implies that there was no restructuring with expansion. Second, it simplifies our study 
tremendously by allowing us to concentrate on how the expansion policy affects individuals’ 
choice between two alternatives: employment upon graduate from high school and going to 
college.  
3.2 Counting and Characterizing Compliers 
(1) LATE framework 
Not all individuals benefit from the policy even they belong to the treatment groups. For 
those with high ability, they can enter college even without the expansion policy; while for 
those with low ability, they can NOT enter college even with the policy. Then the question 
becomes: who benefit from the policy? How many people benefit from the policy? To make 
the problem simple, we divide the total sample into two groups. Those taking college exams 10 
 
before 1999 (Zi=0) and those after 1999 (Zi=1). To keep the two groups balanced, we drop 
those whose college exam year is before 1995. To reemphasize, we drop those professional 
graduate in the subsequent analysis. Another variable D is defined as follows: if individual i 
have a tertiary degree, Di=1; otherwise, Di=0. 
To reflect the influence of the expansion policy on tertiary education, we introduced more 
complicated symbols. D1i is the education decision when influenced by the expansion policy, 
and D0i is the decision when uninfluenced by the policy. Therefore the actual education 
outcome (treatment status) can be represented by: 
( ) 01 0 ii i i i D DD D Z =+ −  
We already assume that people take college exams before 1998 or after 1999 are not 
different systematically except that expansion policy. In other words, the experiment is 
randomly assigned on the individuals. There is no retiming of tertiary education, there is 
neither restructuring between different types of tertiary education. The assumption can also be 
understood as follows: the education decision of people under different policy assignment is 
independent of the policy assignment.  
[] 10 ,
ii i D DZ   (A1: independence assumption) 
It’s debatable that whether A1 holds. However, pretending A1 holds a fairly good starting 
point. Relative to A1, the following assumption is more reasonable.  
10 0   
ii D Di −≥ ∀  (A2: monotonicity assumption) 
Assumption A2 says that anyone’s possibility of going to college will not be decreased by 
the expansion policy. A2 also means that we have two groups of observations: those who are 
influenced by the expansion policy (D1i=1 and D0i=0) and those who are not affected by the 
policy (D1i=0 and D0i=0, or D1i=1 and D0i=1). We call the former group compliers. Under the 
A1 and A2 assumptions, we can calculate the share of the compliers (see appendix for more 
details): 
[ ] [ ] [ ] 10 |1 |0
i i ii ii PD D ED Z ED Z >= = − =  
This means we can get the share of compliers in the sample by simply calculating the 
difference in admission rate between those with Zi=1 and those with Zi=0. We can also get the 
result by regressing Di on Zi (first stage). 11 
 
We can also calculate the share of compliers among those with tertiary degrees (see 
appendix for details). 
[] [ ] [ ] [ ] ( )
[]
10
1| 1 | 0
|1
1
ii i i i
ii i
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In words, the proportion of tertiary graduates who are compliers is given by the first stage, 
times the probability the policy is switched on, divided by the proportion who have tertiary 
degrees.  
Finally, we characterize the compliers. Although the complier is a clear concept, we 
cannot specify which individual is a complier. What we can do is to see their relative 
characteristics. For simplicity, we only consider the characteristics with 0-1 variations (see 
appendix for details).  
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Table 3 report the share of compliers in the whole sample and in the treated sample (college 
graduate). Compared with those taking college exams in 1996, 1997 and 1998, the share of 
college graduate in those taking exams in 1999, 2000, and 2001 is over 4%. This means that 
4% of our sample is those really benefit from the expansion policy under the monotonicity and 
independence assumptions (we already delete those with degrees below junior middle school). 
Next, we calculate the proportion of compliers in the treatment group. The results show that 
among the college graduate, nearly 12-13% of them are compliers. Without the expansion 
policy, they will not be able to enter college. The results for male and female are not 
significantly different. Deleting those with profession degrees and master degrees don’t 
change the results much. 
To minimize the difference between different age groups, we also restrict our sample to 
those taking exams between 1997 and 2000 (see part B of table 3) and to those between 1998 
and 1999 (part C). As the sample shrink, the proportion of compliers in the whole sample and 
in the treatment group decreased. There are two possible reasons. First, the scale of expansion 
enlarged from 1999 to 2001. Second, we don’t know the exact year the individuals taking 
college exams. What we can do is to calculate year exam year according to age. There must be 
errors, which will downward bias the result. 12 
 
Next, we characterize the compliers. This exercise is meaningful for two reasons. First, 
it’s necessary for us to evaluate the expansion policy. No doubt, the beneficiaries are those lies 
in the middle of the ability distributions. Are they different from those non-compliers in terms 
of personal characteristics and family background? Second, this exercise will let us know who 
are on the margin of tertiary education decisions. This type of information is very important 
for policy makers.  
We consider four characteristics, namely sex, ethnicity, region, and single-or-non-single 
child. The first column in table 4 indicates that the proportion of female compliers is slightly 
higher than the proportion of females in the whole sample. The ratio is 1.02 when all samples 
with above high school degree are inclusive, and it turns to be 1.06 when observations with 
professional degrees or master graduate are dropped. Whether the policy favors minority 
depends on sex. For males, the proportion of minorities in the compliers is similar to the 
proportion of minorities in the total male sample, indicating that the expansion does not favor 
nor disfavor minority males. For females, however, the proportion of minority female in the 
compliers is significantly less than the proportion of minority females in the total female 
sample. Minority females are less likely to benefit from the expansion policy. 
To see the regional distribution of compliers, we divide the whole sample into two 
regions, namely eastern region and central-western region. One difficulty is that entering 
college is often associated with changing of hukou status. We therefore use the region of 
hukou five years ago. The proportion of compliers come from eastern areas is larger than the 
proportion of eastern individuals in the whole sample. This is more obvious for females. These 
results suggest that people from the eastern benefit more from the expansion policy. This 
conclusion however depends on the assumption that the hukou information we use reflect 
accurately the hukou region before the individuals taking college entrance exams. If not, the 
results here may just reflect the fact that college students choose to stay at eastern regions after 
graduation even they come from central-western regions. This is very probable because higher 
education is one of the main channel through which people especially those from rural areas 
change their hukou status.  
Finally, we consider whether an individual comes from single-child family. The results 
indicate that the proportion of single child compliers is much higher than the proportion of 
single child in the total sample. The single child families are more likely to benefit from the 
expansion policy. This may indicate another fact of the expansion policy: rural residents 
benefit less than urban residents, because the rural families are much more likely to have more 
than one child.  13 
 
The simple exercises here indicate one important fact. The higher education policy did 
not benefit people of different characteristics homogeneously. Minorities, families from 
central-western regions, non-single-child families benefit less than their majority, eastern, and 
single-child counterparts. These results are not unexpected. As minorities, central-western 
families and non-single-child families are more likely to be poor. High school graduates from 
these families tend to face more credit constraints. This is especially true with the rapid rise of 
college tuitions. Therefore even with the expansion policy they are unable to go to college. 
From the perspective of college education opportunity, the expansion policy can’t be regarded 
as a policy that reduces inequality. To create more opportunity for the poor, there should be 
some companion measures to alleviate financial constraints.  
In the appendix, table A1 gives the numbers of colleges and population for different 
provinces. Obviously, higher education resources are highly unequal among different regions. 
Given the regional disparity of higher education resources and the decentralization of 
education administration, individuals in different provinces will benefit from the expansion 
policy differently. First, this is due to the fact that provincial admission quota has a home bias. 
Second, it’s also due to higher transportation or communication cost when someone goes to 
college outside province.  
Table 5 shows the results. In the regressions, dependent variable is a dummy y with y=1 
representing college graduates and y=0 representing employment (high school graduate). 
Therefore we estimate a linear probability model. Number of college students in school per 
capita and number of faculty and staff in colleges per capita are used as proxies for provincial 
level of higher education resources. Of course, higher education resources may be related to 
regional economic conditions. Therefore, we controlled provincial dummies and province 
specific time trend. In Table 5, both the coefficients for the resource variables (number of 
college students and number of staff and faculty per capita) and their interactions with the 
expansion dummy (policy) are significantly positive. This means that people in resource 
abundant province are more likely to go to college, and that families in these provinces tend to 
benefit more from the expansion policy. One caveat is that going to college usually means the 
location change of household registration. Therefore, we replace the hukou location by those 
of five years ago. The result doesn’t change much (therefore we did not report).  
The result in Table 5 is also important in the following sense. Using both cross sectional 
and time varying variations, we can employ a difference in difference strategy, which did a 
better job to identify how expansion affects the labor market. 
4.  Higher Education Expansion and its Labor Market Consequences 14 
 
4.1 Expansion and employment 
Although the expansion policy was initiated in 1999, the data in 2005 are still not ideally 
appropriate to see the labor market consequences of the policy. As indicated by the first 
column of Table 6, some of the observations are still in school in 2005, especially for the 
cohorts that should have taken college entrance exams between 1999 and 2001. If college 
education takes four years, they should have graduated in 2005. However, some of them may 
go to graduate school, and some may go to primary school at older age, and there are still other 
possibilities such as repeated schooling. Unfortunately, what we can do is to calculate the year 
for taking college exams according to a specified timing of education. Next, we first 
investigate the short term effect of the expansion policy by giving some simple summary 
statistics. 
We delete those who are still in school in the following columns. In the short term, the 
labor market outcome for cohorts that take college exams after 1999 is worse than the earlier 
cohorts. The labor participation rates are significantly lower for the 1999-2001 cohorts. Within 
the unemployed groups (and especially the unemployed college graduate), there is a larger 
share who are “unemployed immediately after graduation” for these policy cohorts. For 
college graduate, the share is over 80%. They are also more likely to depend on their family 
for living. There are two possible reasons. One is policy effect and the other is age effect
9. As 
for age effect, it’s natural that younger people have lower participation rate and depend more 
on their families. As they aged up, they will find better jobs and will eventually live on their 
own income. Unfortunately, we cannot separate these two effects. What we do is to minimize 
age effect. We therefore focus only on two age groups, 1998 cohort and 1999 cohort. Still, 
there is significant difference between these two cohorts in terms of labor participation rate, 
the share of “unemployment immediately after graduation”, and the share of living on families. 
Those who find a job through on-site recruiting fairs also increased. All these indicate that the 
policy has brought pressure for the labor market. One thing worth noting is that all these 
effects are short term effect. In the long run, there will be more individuals enter the labor 
market. The college education may make them more better off. But we need to wait for better 
data. 
4.2 Expansion and within sector inequality 
The pressure brought by the expansion policy should also have effect on income distributions. 
We use ( ) g w to represent income distribution,  ( ) hxto represent the composition distribution 
                                                               
9 There is also cohort effect. We can think of pooling the cohort effect with age effect.  15 
 
(the ratio of high school graduates to college graduates), and ( ) | f wxto represent skill price. 
Therefore we have: 
( ) ( ) ( ) | g wf w x h x d x =∫  
It is clear that the expansion policy changed the composition ( ) hxsignificantly, with the 
share of college graduate increase and that of high school graduate decreased. When there are 
only high school graduates and college graduates in the sample, ( ) | f wxrepresents return to 
college. With the composition change mentioned above, we expect the return to college to 
change also (probably to decline). 
To investigate how expansion affects inequality, we employ a Difference-in-Difference 
strategy. The specification is as follows: 
*X
*X *
                  *
ij ij i ij
ii j









To have more observations, we aggregate our income and policy data at the city (i) and 
industry (j) level. In the above model, inequality refers to standard deviation of log hour 
income in region i and industry j, share is the proportion of individuals who are affected by the 
expansion policy in the same cell. student is the number of college students in school at the per 
capita level in 1998 in the province where region i locates. We use this variable as a proxy for 
the higher education resources at different provinces. We don’t use the city level college 
student data because the both the admission quota and graduate allocation are at the provincial 
level. As this variable is closely related to economic conditions and other factors, we 
controlled some other variables (X), including GDP per capita, urbanization rate (proportion 
of urban population), sex ratio, region dummies (east, central and west), and industry 
dummies.  
It’s easy to understand that we can’t interpret the coefficient of share as the causal effect 
of expansion on inequality. It’s true that the larger the share variable, the more the population 
affected by the expansion policy. But it’s also true that people at different ages will have 
different income levels according to human capital theory even without expansion policy. The 
coefficient of student can be taken as the causal effect neither. Although provinces with more 
prior resources (represented by college student) tend to expand to a larger extent, there are 
many other region specific factors correlated with it. In this paper, we interpret the coefficient 16 
 
for the interaction of these two variables ( β ) as the causal effect of expansion on inequality. 
That means if there are more college graduates not only because there’re more younger people 
but also because they are in a province with more higher education resources, we interpret this 
as the result of expansion. 
In column 1 of Table 7, the coefficient for the interaction term is -0.074, meaning that 
within sector inequality decreases with expansion. The effect is not significant however 
(standard error is 0.062). In column 4, we delete observations for Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, 
Chongqing, and Guangdong, because these 5 provinces (municipalities) are special in that 
much more higher education resources are concentrated in these regions, and that a large 
number of colleges or universities are managed by the central government (and therefore 
universities in these areas have much bigger proportions of student from other provinces). For 
the remaining provinces, the effect of the expansion becomes larger and more significant. The 
coefficient for the interaction term is -0.144 and significant at the 5% level, which means that 
expansion policy significantly decreased within sector inequality. 
To show more directly that the negative effect is due to the relative increase in the number 
of college graduate, we use the interaction term ( X share student ) as the instrument for the 
current proportion of college student, and run a two stage least square estimation: 
01 2
3 *X
* X *        first stage
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The first stage results are reported in column 2 of Table 7. In the analysis using aggregated 
data at the region-industry level, the coefficient on the interaction term is still significantly 
positive, consistent with the results in Table 5. In the second stage regression, the coefficient 
for the share of college students (college) is negative (not significant however). Therefore, we 
have evidence that expansion policy increased the fraction of college graduates in the labor 
force, which in turn decreased the intra-industry inequality. Column 5 and 6 are the results 
after we delete the four municipalities and Guangdong province.  
The exercise from column 7 to column 12 repeated the previous exercises. The difference 
is that we keep only those with urban hukou. No matter OLS or 2SLS, the results become more 
significant with the direction of the coefficients unchanged.  17 
 
4.3 Expansion and income levels 
As emphasized before, income distribution (inequality) depends on two aspects: distribution 
of characteristics and skill prices. Even we have established the results that expansion causes 
inequality to decline, it’s still difficult to evaluate how the expansion influences relative 
income levels. In Table 8, we investigate how the expansion policy affect the relative income 
level between high school graduates and college graduates using the same strategy as above. 
The observation is still at the region-industry level. When we use the difference in log wages 
between college graduates and high school graduates, the coefficient for the interaction term is 
negative (-0.168 with the standard error of 0.189). This means that the expansion policy 
decreased the return to college within sectors. In column 2 and 3, we use the log wages for 
high school graduates and college graduates as dependent variable respectively. The 
coefficient in column 2 for high school graduate is 0.155 (significant at the 1% level), and that 
in column 3 for college graduates is -0.015 (not significant). The decrease in income gap 
between college graduates and high school graduates is mainly due to the increase in the 
income levels for high school graduates. The decrease of the income level for college 
graduates plays a minor role. In column 4 and 5, data for municipalities and Guangdong 
province are dropped. The increase for high school graduates decreased a little bit, which is 
0.125 significant at 10% level. That for college graduates become more negative (-0.068) but 
still not significant. In columns 6, 7, and 8, we delete observations that have missing wage 
value either for high school graduates or for college graduates to make observations in these 
three columns identical. Still, expansion policy cause the income gap to decrease, which is 
mainly due to the increase in the income level for high school graduates. In column 8, the 
coefficient is positive, but still not significant.  
5.  Conclusion and Discussion 
The radical expansion of higher education commenced in 1999 and in subsequent years is 
historical and is believed to have huge impact on China’s society and economy. Yet little 
empirical work has been done to evaluate its effects on education opportunities, and on labor 
market outcomes.
10 Using a random sample from the 1% census data in 2005, we find that 
compliers (those go to college because of the expansion policy) in the expansion are more 
likely to come from eastern and urban areas, and less likely to be minority female, from poor 
families and from families with more than one child. We also find that higher education 
resources at provincial level have significant impact on how the expansion affects college 
opportunities. All these indicate that the expansion effects are not homogeneous among 
                                                               
10 Li et al, (2008) is a notable exception. However, their focus is on the global implications of this transformation. 18 
 
regions and among different populations. One reason underlying these results is financial 
constraints, which is consistent with the fact that college tuitions increased by huge amount 
during the late 1990s and early 2000s. The other side of the same reason is the inadequacy of 
measures to cope with these constraints. The current scholarships or student loans programs 
haven’t solved the problems effectively, and more work need to be done. Another reason is 
decentralization of education system, which gives provincial government great autonomy, 
including setting admission quota each year. Therefore, decentralization (with the fact that 
higher education resources are not evenly allocated) makes the effect of expansion different 
for different provinces. 
The first set of the results also has implications for some related policy debates. One is 
the financial problem of colleges and universities. As the scale of higher education was 
expanded, college or universities run in shortage of spaces for teaching, studying and lodging. 
Therefore, many of them started construction of new buildings. One important source of 
finance came from the banks. According to China’s Education Blue Book in 2007, the loan 
scale reached to 450 to 500 billion by the end of 2006.
11 How to pay the loans is a big issue in 
China’s higher education (Lin, 2008).
12 Someone argue that the loans should be bored by the 
government because the expansion benefits all the people.
 13 We don’t want to go to detail of 
the debt problems, but our results invalidate the above claim. 
Our second set of results confirms the great pressure on labor market (especially urban 
areas) induced by the expansion. College graduates have more difficulties to find employment, 
and the income gap between college graduates and high school graduates is lower where the 
expansion policy has more impact. These results also provide empirical evidence for the 
current evaluation on the expansion policy itself. The expansion has long been blamed for 
being too radical that caused serious unemployment problem for college graduates. Casual 
observations of the crowds in recruiting fairs support this view. However, without systematic 
empirical evidence, this view can be challenged easily.
14 Our empirical support the claim that 
expansion policy creates pressure on the labor market. However, our results don’t imply that 
the expansion policy is unjustified. The expansion policy has other effects including 
                                                               





14 There’re several competing explanations for the difficult conditions faced by college graduates. Some pointed out that the 
difficulty is due to China’s dualistic feature (http://www.gmw.cn/CONTENT/2009-12/31/content_1031238.htm); others emphasize that 
more unemployment for young labors is a common feature of the labor market, therefore we can’t blame expansion policy for 
the difficult conditions faced by college graduates (http://www.ilib2.com/A-QCode~xcj200902040.html; 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2009-03/08/content_10966534.htm). 19 
 
accelerating China’s urbanization process and making the economic conditions more stable. 
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(Calculated) Yr of CEE
 
Note: from left to right, each column for high school, 3-year college, and 4-year college (and above) respectively. The upper panels are for absolute numbers and the lower panels are for 




Variables   weighted unweighted 
Age     29.14  29.06 
Female (%)    52  52 
Minority(%)   10  12 
Eastern(%)   48  53 
One Chile(%)    33  34 
Education  Level(%)     
Below Primary    2.65  3.28 
Primary   18.27  18.93 
Middle School    52.87  49.97 
High School    15.07  15.65 
3 Year College    7.16  7.59 
4 Year College    3.65  4.16 
Master and above    0.33  0.41 
Age Groups(%, theoretical year of taking exams in “( )”)       
35（1988）   9.82  9.47 
34（1989）   8.94  8.75 
33（1990）   8.51  8.37 
32（1991）   8.21  8.15 
31（1992）   7.84  7.83 
30（1993）   7.13  7.1 
29（1994）   6.74  6.75 
28（1995）   5.95  5.95 
27（1996）   6.23  6.29 
26（1997）   6.32  6.38 
25（1998）   5.94  6.08 
24（1999）   5.99  6.11 
23（2000）   6.68  6.84 
22（2001）   5.7  5.94 






 Male   Female 
  Model 1  Model 2    Model 3   Model 4 












A :            
T  0.004 0.003 0.003   0.022***  0.031***  0.030*** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)   (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
policy  -0.007  0.200*** 0.202***   -0.028  0.152*** 0.156*** 
 (0.029)  (0.034)  (0.034)   (0.028)  (0.035)  (0.034) 
Constant  -8.915 -7.020 -6.803   -44.379***  -62.359***  -61.514*** 
 (5.833)  (6.965)  (6.950)   (5.936)  (7.559)  (7.551) 
R2_p  0.005   0.008   0.006   0.013 
N  80835   59911   75582   53804 
chi2(4)  6.06     11.48    
Prob  >  chi2  0.1948     0.0217    
chi2(1)  0.88     6.59    
Prob  >  chi2  0.3494     0.0102    
B:        
T  0.006*  0.001 0.001   0.023***  0.028***  0.027*** 
 (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)   (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
yr1998  -0.054  0.016 0.016   -0.033  0.011 0.011 
 (0.039)  (0.046)  (0.046)   (0.037)  (0.046)  (0.046) 
yr1999  -0.051  0.163*** 0.164***   -0.088**  0.095**  0.100** 
 (0.040)  (0.046)  (0.046)   (0.039)  (0.047)  (0.047) 
yr2000  -0.013  0.224*** 0.225***   -0.032  0.141*** 0.144*** 
 (0.041)  (0.047)  (0.047)   (0.040)  (0.048)  (0.048) 
yr2001  -0.015  0.250*** 0.250***   0.013  0.277*** 0.282*** 
 (0.045)  (0.051)  (0.051)   (0.043)  (0.052)  (0.052) 
Constant  -12.835*  -3.935 -3.788   -45.610***  -57.038***  -56.164*** 
 (6.740)  (8.085)  (8.069)   (6.932)  (8.882)  (8.871) 
R2_p  0.005   0.008   0.006   0.013 
N  80835   59911   75582   53804 
chi2(7)  5.92     14.92    
Prob  >  chi2  0.549     0.037    
chi2(4)  0.99     8.44    
Prob  >  chi2  0.9109     0.0769    
Note: ***, **, * represent the significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Standard errors are in (). We 
controlled region dummies in the regression. 25 
 
 
Table 3 The Share of Compliers 
  Samples with above high school degree 
  Male (1)  Female (2) 
A: 96/97/98(Z=0) vs 99/00/01(Z=1)    
P[Z=1]  0.516   0.523  
E[D|Z=0]  0.219   0.229  
E[D|Z=1]  0.264   0.280  
P[D=1]  0.242   0.256  
P[D1>D0]  0.044   0.051  
P[D1>D0|D=1]  0.095   0.103  
B: 97/98(Z=0) vs 99/00(Z=1)    
P[Z=1]  0.521   0.526  
E[D|Z=0]  0.221   0.229  
E[D|Z=1]  0.260   0.267  
P[D=1]  0.241   0.249  
P[D1>D0]  0.040   0.038  
P[D1>D0|D=1]  0.086   0.081  
C: 98(Z=0) vs 99(Z=1)    
P[Z=1]  0.517   0.512  
E[D|Z=0]  0.225   0.236  
E[D|Z=1]  0.254   0.258  
P[D=1]  0.240   0.248  
P[D1>D0]  0.029   0.022  





 Male=1  East=1   Minority  =1   Single  child=1 
Characteristics (X) 
      Male   Female    Male   Female    Male   Female 
   (1)   (2)  (3)   (4)  (5)   (6)  (7) 
96/97/98(Z=0) vs 99/00/01(Z=1)                  
E[D|Z=0]    0.22     0.22   0.23     0.22   0.23     0.22   0.23  
E[D|Z=1]    0.27     0.26   0.28     0.26   0.28     0.26   0.28  
E[D|Z=0,x=1]    0.22     0.25   0.25     0.17   0.25     0.34   0.37  
E[D|Z=1,x=1]    0.26     0.29   0.32     0.23   0.28     0.42   0.47  
P[x=1|D1i>D0i]/ P[x=1]    0.94     1.03   1.28     1.37   0.55     1.70   1.88  
97/98(Z=0) vs 99/00(Z=1)                   
E[D|Z=0]    0.22     0.22   0.23     0.22   0.23     0.22   0.23  
E[D|Z=1]    0.26     0.26   0.27     0.26   0.27     0.26   0.27  
E[D|Z=0,x=1]    0.22     0.25   0.25     0.18   0.27     0.35   0.38  
E[D|Z=1,x=1]    0.26     0.28   0.30     0.22   0.24     0.40   0.45  
P[x=1|D1i>D0i]/ P[x=1]    1.02     0.97   1.17     0.96   -0.78     1.41   1.74  
98(Z=0) vs 99(Z=1)                   
E[D|Z=0]    0.23     0.23   0.24     0.23   0.24     0.23   0.24  
E[D|Z=1]    0.26     0.25   0.26     0.25   0.26     0.25   0.26  
E[D|Z=0,x=1]    0.23     0.25   0.26     0.18   0.25     0.36   0.38  
E[D|Z=1,x=1]    0.25     0.28   0.29     0.25   0.24     0.39   0.44  





 Male  Female 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Policy -0.008  -0.018  0.004  -0.015 
 (0.012)  (0.016)  (0.012) (0.016) 
faculty and staff # in 98  0.099***    0.102***   
  (0.003)   (0.003)  
faculty and staff # in 98*policy   0.017***    0.024***   
  (0.005)   (0.005)  
# of student in college 98    0.137***    0.139*** 
   (0.004)   (0.004) 
# of student in college 98*policy    0.020***    0.031*** 
   (0.006)   (0.006) 
Constant 0.010  -0.060***  -0.009  -0.078*** 
 (0.006)  (0.008)  (0.007) (0.008) 
R2_a 0.043  0.042  0.05  0.049 
F  539 523 568 550 
N  59911 59911 53804 53804 
Note: ***, **, * represent the significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Standard errors are in (). Province 







Never work    Main source of income    Whether looking for a job within last 3 month    Age groups 
(the year of taking exams) 
In school 
 Unemployed   
After graduation 




Other   No searching 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (5) (6) (7)    (8) (9)  (10)  (11)  (12) 
Above high school                                        
1993  0.61   12.78   6.72     86.49   10.37   3.14     5.21   14.34   3.02   10.94   66.49  
1994  0.89   13.56   10.01     85.86   11.13   3.01     6.21   13.71   3.57   11.72   64.79  
1995  1.06   13.70   13.54     85.49   11.59   2.92     8.02   11.66   4.68   13.20   62.44  
1996  1.57   14.44   17.08     84.93   12.33   2.74     8.00   13.42   4.90   13.42   60.26  
1997  1.80   14.57   23.38     84.75   12.67   2.58     9.12   15.71   4.56   13.68   56.93  
1998  4.05   16.12   30.83     83.18   14.28   2.54     10.41   16.40   6.52   13.47   53.20  
1999  6.75   16.39   42.91   82.87   14.84   2.29     11.27   15.20   8.84   13.48   51.21  
2000  12.85   19.57   51.79   79.66   17.99   2.35     13.86   16.32   10.90   13.09   45.83  
2001  26.23   21.47   62.65   77.84   19.80   2.36     15.61   18.97   10.69   12.70   42.03  
College graduate                                        
1993    2.97   11.63     96.54   2.28   1.18     11.63   6.98   9.30   9.30   62.79  
1994    4.44   13.85     94.74   3.42   1.84     7.69   10.77   7.69   18.47   55.38  
1995    5.18   35.21     94.53   4.16   1.31     12.68   7.04   11.27   22.53   46.48  
1996    3.89   33.33     96.05   3.37   0.58     15.00   6.67   16.67   11.66   50.00  
1997    6.34   48.00     93.41   5.45   1.14     11.00   14.00   15.00   17.00   43.00  
1998    7.53   60.00     91.94   6.81   1.25     26.09   12.17   16.52   19.13   26.09  
1999      11.97   75.88   87.73   11.00   1.27     17.17   12.12   24.24   14.65   31.82  
2000      17.68   80.73   81.74   16.85   1.41     15.27   9.45   28.36   12.37   34.55  






  All provinces  Municipalities and guangdong deleted  All provinces  Municipalities and guangdong deleted 
  OLS 2SLS    OLS 2SLS    OLS 2SLS    OLS 2SLS   
    First Second      First Second      First Second      First Second   
  （1）  （2）  （3）  （4）  （5）  （6）  （7）  （8）  （9）  （10）  （11）  （12） 
policyXstudent  -0.074  0.185***   -0.144** 0.143***   -0.149** 0.223***   -0.254***  0.178***  
 (0.062)  (0.050)    (0.068) (0.053)   (0.072) (0.055)   (0.079) (0.060)  
College    -0.397    -1.007    -0.668*    -1.425** 
    (0.362)    (0.622)    (0.368)    (0.664) 
Policy  0.162  -0.356*** 0.020  0.298**  -0.281*** 0.015  0.368**  -0.440*** 0.074**  0.567***  -0.359*** 0.056 
 (0.128)  (0.103)  (0.024)  (0.138) (0.109) (0.030) (0.149) (0.114) (0.030) (0.162) (0.122) (0.041) 
student  0.011 0.016 0.017 -0.005  -0.006  -0.011  0.020 0.012 0.029 0.007 -0.009  -0.006 
 (0.015)  (0.012)  (0.021)  (0.016) (0.013) (0.019) (0.017) (0.013) (0.023) (0.018) (0.013) (0.024) 
Gdp_pc  -0.007***  -0.002 -0.007***  -0.009***  0.003  -0.006 -0.006**  -0.003 -0.007**  -0.009***  0.004  -0.004 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) 
Urban  rate  -0.053***  0.155*** 0.008  -0.048** 0.158*** 0.111  -0.017  0.144*** 0.079  0.006  0.147*** 0.215** 
 (0.018)  (0.014)  (0.059)  (0.019) (0.015) (0.101) (0.024) (0.018) (0.059) (0.026) (0.019) (0.105) 
Sex  ratio  0.002  -0.007 -0.001 0.003  -0.014 -0.011 -0.005 -0.007 -0.009 -0.009 -0.014 -0.030 
 (0.017)  (0.014)  (0.019)  (0.018) (0.014) (0.025) (0.020) (0.015) (0.023) (0.021) (0.016) (0.033) 
R-squared  0.072 0.519 .  0.077 0.521 .  0.069 0.521 .  0.068 0.525 . 
N  4499 4499 4499 4069 4069 4069 4071 4071 4071 3656 3656 3656 











    Depdent var=                             
  ln(coll wg)-ln(hs wg）  ln(hs wg)  ln(coll wg)  ln(hs wg)  ln(coll wg)  ln(coll wg)-ln(hs wg）  ln(hs wg)  ln(coll wg) 
    All provinces  Municipalities and guangdong deleted  Municipalities and guangd and missing values deleted 
    (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
policyXstudent  -0.168  0.155**  -0.015 0.125* -0.068 -0.254  0.366**  0.112 
 (0.189)  (0.064)  (0.122) (0.067) (0.127) (0.213) (0.157)  (0.181) 
Policy 0.388  -0.368***  -0.095 -0.312**  0.032  0.577  -0.826**  -0.249 
 (0.393)  (0.130)  (0.255) (0.136) (0.263) (0.436) (0.323)  (0.372) 
student 0.128  -0.019  0.137**  -0.086**  -0.025  0.083  -0.189**  -0.106 
 (0.093)  (0.036)  (0.062) (0.038) (0.064) (0.101) (0.075)  (0.086) 
Gdp_pc  0.010  -0.001 0.017**  -0.011*  -0.007 -0.000  -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.010)  (0.005)  (0.008) (0.006) (0.009) (0.012) (0.009)  (0.010) 
Urban rate  -0.218***  0.076***  -0.077  0.082***  0.014  -0.174*  0.168**  -0.006 
 (0.081)  (0.023)  (0.065) (0.025) (0.067) (0.091) (0.067)  (0.077) 
Sex  ratio  0.000  -0.137***  -0.009 -0.148***  -0.039 -0.007  -0.069 -0.076 
 (0.067)  (0.023)  (0.043) (0.024) (0.043) (0.073) (0.054)  (0.062) 
Constant 0.701***  2.136*** 2.637*** 2.295*** 3.041*** 0.850***  2.407*** 3.257*** 
 (0.248)  (0.084)  (0.181) (0.089) (0.187) (0.272) (0.201)  (0.232) 
R-squared  0.030  0.279 0.147 0.252 0.079 0.025  0.166 0.078 
N  1358  3927 1662 3517 1419 1124  1124 1124 
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2.  Counting compliers in the college graduate: 
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Table A1 Population and number of universities and colleges in 1998 in different provinces 
Province  # of college  population     Province  #  of  college  population 
Beijing 63  1240    Henan  51  9243 
Tianjin 20  953    Hubei  54  5873 
Hebei 46 6525    Hunan  47  6465 
Shanxi 23  3141    Guangdong  43  7051 
Inner Mongolia  19  2326    Guangxi  28  4633 
Liaoning 61  4138   Hainan  5  743 
Jilin 41  2628    Chongqing  22 3042 
Heilongjiang 38  3751    Sichuan  43  8430 
Shanghai 40  1457   Guizhou  20  3606 
Jiangsu 66  7148    Yunnan  26  4094 
Zhejiang 32  4435   Tibet  4  248 
Anhui 34 6127    Sha'anxi  42  3570 
Fujian 29 3282    Gansu  17  2494 
Jiangxi 31  4150    Qinghai  6  496 
Shandong 49  8785    Ningxia  5  530 
             Xinjiang  17  1718   
 
 